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ABUSE OF POWER:
CERTAIN STATE COURTS ARE DISREGARDING
STANDING AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
PRINCIPLES SO THEY CAN DECLARE TORT
REFORM UNCONSTITUTIONAL*
I. INTRODUCTION

Tort reform is on the agenda of many state legislatures across the
United States! New bills are subject to a court test to verify their
constitutionality. Tort reform legislation has triggered both an external
clash between the legislature and the judiciary, and internal strife within
the judiciary, over the proper scope of judicial power. In Ohio, for
instance, both branches fired their best shots in stubborn attempts to
assert their respective fortitude. When the dust settled, a substantial
portion of Ohio tort reform law was struck down as unconstitutional
State legislatures, meanwhile, were left pondering their next move and
wondering if the "statutory age",3 was beginning to wane. The judiciary,
at least those judges who promote extensive judicial power, won round
one, but the war over judicial power, in the context of tort reform, is
only beginning.
Financial responsibility plays an integral role in tort law across the
nation. Tort reform legislation, which curbs this responsibility by
establishing statutory damage caps, is a direct attack on plaintiff
attorneys' financial self-interests. The conflict between state legislatures
and plaintiff bars can be phrased in simple terms. Lawmakers firmly
* This Comment won 3rd Place in the 2000 International Defense Counsel Writing
Contest, and was originally published in the October 2000 issue of the Defense Counsel
Journal.
1. See, e.g., H.B. 1070, 145th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ga. 1999); H.B. 1695, 20th Leg., 1st Sess.

(Haw. 1999); H.B. 2878, 78th Legis., 1st Sess. (Kan. 1999); H.B. 4662, 181st Leg., 1st Sess.
(Mass: 1999); L.R. 204, 96th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1999); A.B. 7545,222nd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.Y.
1999); H.B. 1980, 47th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1999); S.B. 1065, 183rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Pa. 1999);
S.B. 533, 113th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1999); H.B. 2088, 56th Legis., 1st Sess. (Wash. 1999). See
generallyWilliam C. Smith, Prying Off Tort Reform Caps, 85 A.B.A.J. 28 (Oct. 1999).
2. See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1072,
recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999).

3. See

GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1

(1982);

Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1995).
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believe in a policy limiting financial punishment of wrongdoers, while
attorneys who receive contingency fees want to maximize potential
profits. Judges enter the mix because many believe in the common law
principle of expanded liability.4 Currently, the Ohio Supreme Court is
illustrative of this three-dimensional struggle

Justice Resnick of the

Ohio Supreme Court points out that "for more than a decade, Ohio has
been home to an ongoing conflict over the necessity and propriety of
transforming the civil justice system."6 Professor Stephen J. Werber
adds that the Ohio Constitution "forms the battleground" for the war
between the legislative and judicial branches of the state government.
Wisconsin, along with every other state, should look to Ohio as an
example of blatant judicial violation of jurisdictional doctrine.
The casualties in this war are, at a practical level, long-standing
constitutional and statutory jurisdictional principles, standing and
original jurisdiction, and at a more theoretical level, the separation of
powers doctrine. These three casualties, since they represent legal
principles that embody the traditional goals of the American legal
system, make tort reform an issue of national concern.
Supreme courts in Ohio and Missouri recently exercised jurisdiction
over constitutional attacks on tort reform despite admitting that the
respective challenging parties did not suffer a concrete injury."
Although other states have declared tort reform statutes
unconstitutional, 9 they have not inappropriately relaxed standing
requirements to do so.'0 The Ohio decision also involved an improper
4. See Stephen J. Werber, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law: Ohio Tort
Reform Versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1996).
5. See id. at 1156.
6. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1071; see also Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998:
The War Continues, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539,539 (1997).
7. Werber, supranote 4, at 1156.
8. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1119 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting); see also Rodriguez v.
Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 68 (Mo. 1999) (White, J., dissenting).
9. See Mark Thompson, Letting the Air out of Tort Reform, 83 A.B.A. J. 64, 65 (1997).
"Through the end of 1996, high courts in 24 states had handed down 61 different decisions
overturning all or parts of laws that attempted to limit damages or erect other hurdles to
discourage law suits." Id. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Barry M. Parsons, State High
Courts Take on Tort Reform: JudicialNullification of Legislative Action Continues, PRODUCT
LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, April 1998, at 10.
10. See, e.g., Best v. Traylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (declaring entire
Illinois Tort Reform Bill unconstitutional); Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E. 2d 491 (Ind. 1999);
Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ohio 1991) (plurality opinion) (voiding statute setting
damage cap for medical malpractice actions under due process grounds); Lakin v. Senco
Prod., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999). Other states have declared non-economic damage caps
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991);
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recognition of original jurisdiction."
Ohio courts are the leading
proponents of judicial activism and have not refrained from invalidating
legislative acts of the Ohio General Assembly, even where the executive

branch concurred that such legislation was vital."2
Tort reform advocates may argue that the Ohio judiciary is
essentially vetoing legislative acts. 3 At the other end of the spectrum,
judicial activists contend that judges are acting within their power and in
the best interest of society as a whole. Unlike federal courts, Ohio

does not foster a policy of conservative review of legislative activity. 5
Although the Ohio Supreme Court, as a state instrument, is not bound
by the federal constitutional requirement that a dispute must present a
case or controversy, the court violated Ohio jurisdictional principles by
recognizing original jurisdiction in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward.7
This Comment discusses the impact of judicial activism in Ohio and

Missouri on the validity of contemporary jurisdictional principles. Is the
expansive approach to standing simply a means for the judiciary to

Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H.
1991). Victor Schwartz, General Counsel for the American Tort Reform Association, asserts
that there have been roughly 90 court decisions overturning tort reform over the past few
years. See Jean Hellwege, Ohio Supreme Court Axes Tort 'Reform' Law, 35 Trial 13 (Oct.
1999).
11. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1114-15 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
12. See Werber, supranote 4, at 1157.
13. Professor Martin H. Redish of Northwestern calls this trend "an open and blatant
judicial second-guessing of the wisdom and morality of a legislative policy judgment,
something that is totally unacceptable in a constitutional democracy." Thompson, supra note
9, at 66 (citing Professor Martin H. Redish of Northwestern). Werber calls the Ohio Supreme
Court a "super legislature." Werber, supranote 6, at 540.
14. Robert S. Peck suggests that state legislatures are to blame. In discussing House Bill
350, Peck argues that "the new law was nothing less than a bold assault on the authority,
responsibilities, and prerogatives of the judiciary that also substantially interfered with the
rights of injured people to seek access to the courts." Robert S. Peck, Ohio Tort 'Reform'
Measure Overturned, 35 Trial 66 (Nov. 1999). Moreover, courts are not overturning all tort
reform. See, e.g., Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1989) (upholding $100,000 limit on
non-economic damages for wrongful death). Leiker was, however, subsequently overruled by
Martindalev. Terry, 829 P.2d 561 (Kan. 1992).
15. Federal courts generally give deference to congressional discretion. See, e.g., Heller
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
16. See infra Part II.B.1 for an overview of the federal case or controversy requirement.
17. 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1119, recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999) (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting). See also infra Part III for a discussion of the Ohio Supreme Court's improper
recognition of original jurisdiction.
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manipulate the tort reform movement? Do standing and original
jurisdiction principles sufficiently check the potential for judicial abuse
of power? Most importantly, is bending jurisdictional doctrine an
inappropriate exercise of judicial power? Part II discusses the
controversial grant of standing by the Ohio Supreme Court in Sheward
and by the Missouri Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor

Corp.18 It includes an overview of the concept of standing, a description
of why standing is problematic in state court, and a discussion of why
careless neglect of standing principles can have severe consequences.
Part III explores the Ohio Supreme Court's grant of original jurisdiction
in Sheward. This part reveals how that court blatantly disregarded Ohio
common law when it granted both a writ of prohibition and a writ of
mandamus.
This Comment reaches two conclusions. First, state legislatures, at
least those in Ohio and Missouri, that wish to reform tort law must
advocate a shift in their respective state's standing policy toward the
stricter federal requirements. Absent this necessary change, state
supreme courts will still have the power to invalidate tort reform
statutes in cases where there has not been a specific injury
demonstrating how the statute is unconstitutional. Second, the Ohio
Supreme Court clearly abused their power when they granted original
jurisdiction in Sheward.
II. A NEW DOCTRINE OF STANDING
A. Introduction

1. Injury-in-Fact
Constitutional challenges to tort reform legislation fall into two
distinct categories. The first category consists of parties who are
personally affected by an allegedly unconstitutional statute. For
instance, if a court reduced a jury-determined damage award because of
a statutory limit on punitive damages, the adversely affected plaintiff
could appeal the award by contesting the constitutionality of the
statute. ' 9 Courts grant standing in these situations because the litigant
18. 996 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1999).
19. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1999)
(holding that state statutory damage cap should not have been enforced and jury damage
award should be reinstated); Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Cobb, 714 N.E.2d 295 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that damage award was subject to state's statutory damage cap); Crowe
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has a personal stake in the controversy at hand. 0 The party's clear
injury2' is the reduced damage award that could be rectified by a court
reinstating the original award.
2. Extraordinary Writ
The second category, far less frequent than the first, includes parties
who at the time of the claim have not suffered a concrete injury from the
allegedly unconstitutional statute. These claims typically involve third
party writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition actions challenging the
constitutionality of one or more tort reform statutes. = These writs are
generally brought by a large group of people who contend that the issue
is sufficiently important for the court to grant original jurisdiction.'
B. GeneralOverview of Standing
Rodriguez and Sheward are dangerous precedents that have the
potential to encourage judicial abuse of power, trigger a flood of
litigation, and severely weaken state legislatures. In order to appreciate
and understand the severity of this Comment's conclusions, however, it
is important to clarify pertinent standing principles of both the federal
and state court systems. This background section illustrates the
following: (1) the fundamental discrepancies between federal and state
standing policies; (2) that relaxed standing policy in Ohio, Missouri and
Wisconsin is problematic; and (3) that this topic should be of concern to
the nation and to the several states, including the state of Wisconsin.
1. Federal Requirements
Federal courts generally incorporate standing principles into the case
or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States
Courts also incorporate prudential standing
Constitution."

v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas, No. 73-206,1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5075, at *1 (Oct. 29, 1998).
20. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962).
21. See infra Part II.B. for an explanation of the injury-in-fact requirement.
22. See, e.g., Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1085.
23. See infra Part III for a discussion of original jurisdiction.
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968)
(noting that the complaint failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III
of the United States Constitution by failing to allege an actual case or controversy). For a
general overview of the federal standing policy see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUrIONAL LAW 83-107 (2000); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
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requirements to supplement the constitutional principles. Standing in
federal court is a mandatory prerequisite to the court's exercise of
jurisdiction.2'
The constitutional requirements are binding on all federal courts.
First, the litigant must suffer an injury-in-fact that is concrete and
particularized.' The injury must be "actual or imminent."2' The injury
must be individuated. In other words, a prospective litigant cannot
merely show that she "suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with
people generally. "8 If an injury has not yet become sufficiently concrete
or is not readily imminent, the issue is not ripe for judicial review.'
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct alleged to be improper.3 Third, the issue must be redressible: it
must be likely that the litigant's injury will be remedied by a favorable
decision." Finally, the issue must be ripe32 and not moot.33 For instance,
if a statute has not yet harmed a party but may do so in the future, the
case is not ripe for judicial review. Alternatively, if a prospective party
has been redressed for his or her injury by the time the party brings the
suit, then the case is moot and the court is precluded from exercising
jurisdiction.
Prudential standing requirements include court rules barring people
from raising claims of third parties,' precluding parties from litigating
"generalized grievances,"3' and requiring that the injury fall within the
"zone of interest" intended by Congress.3

25. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 89-90.

26. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,508 (1975).
27. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)).
28. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
29. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 ("Where there is no actual harm, however, its
imminence.., must be established.").
30. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41-42 (1976).
31. See id.
32. See United Pub. Workers of Am. Org. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
33. See Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964); St. Pierre v. United States, 319
U.S. 41,42 (1943); Exparte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900).
34. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 124 (1976).
35. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208,221-27 (1974)).
36. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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2. Ohio Requirements
Standing in Ohio is a common-law doctrine.3 The Ratchford court
articulated a three-part test similar to the federal doctrine. That test set
forth the following:
(1) the litigant has suffered or will suffer a specific injury;
(2) injury resulted from the action/inaction being challenged; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed if the court invalidates the
action/inaction being challenged.'
Litigants do not have standing in situations where their injury is
merely abstract or suspected.3 ' For an association to have standing, they
must establish that its members have suffered an actual injury-in-fact. '
Ohio case law also mandates that the injury be individual." The
Masterson court patterned this requirement on the federal decision in
Massachusetts v. Mellon.4 2 The Masterson court articulated that "[a]
private citizen may not restrain official acts when they fail to allege and
prove damage to themselves different in character from that sustained
by the public generally., 43 Further, in State ex rel. Daliman v. Court of
Common Pleas, the court also followed federal standing doctrine.'
3. Missouri Requirements
Standing issues have arisen in Missouri courts in cases involving
constitutional questions. In Missouri, "not just anyone has standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute. " The rationale behind the
standing requirement is to assure there is a sufficient controversy
between parties so the case can be adequately presented to the court.46
Moreover, when challenging the validity of a statute, "a litigant must
himself be hurt by the unconstitutional exercise of power before he may
37. See State ex rel. Consumers League v. Ratchford, 457 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982).
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Bicking, 643 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Ohio 1994).
41. See State ex reL Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 123 N.E.2d 1, 1 (Ohio
1954).
42. 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
43. 123 N.E.2d at 2 (citations omitted).
44. 298 N.E.2d 515,516 (Ohio 1973).
45. Ryder v. County of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 705,707 (Mo. 1977).
46. See id.
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be heard to complain. 47
At a more general level, litigants in Missouri courts must be

"adversely affected by the statute in question."48 Another Missouri court,
adopting language from the federal courts, noted that in order to invoke
the court's jurisdiction, the party must allege "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy. "49
4. Wisconsin Requirements
Standing in Wisconsin, although not a jurisdictional requirement per
se, is a matter of "sound judicial policy. " Courts will generally discuss
whether the challenged action caused an injury-in-fact. 1
Some
Wisconsin courts hold that even a "trifling" interest in the issue is
sufficient to establish standing.52 Yet, other cases hold that the litigant

needs a direct and personal pecuniary interest in the litigation.3

Since the Wisconsin courts have not reached a consensus with regard

to a concrete standing doctrine, some courts have looked to the federal
courts for guidance. For instance, Bank of Coloma relied extensively on
federal case law when it stated that "[t]o meet the requirement of an
injury, a plaintiff must allege 'such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy.' 4 However, the court in Wisconsin's Environmental
47. State ex rel. Reser v. Rush, 562 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978) (citing Blue Bank v.
State Banking Bd., 509 S.W.2d 763,766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
48. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hughlett, 729 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. 1987) (citing Ryder, 552
S.W.2d at 707) (emphasis added).
49. Harrison v. Monroe County, 716 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. 1986) (citing Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490,498-99 (1975)).
50. Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 158 N.W.2d 306,314 (Wis. 1968); see also State ex rel.
Rosenhein v. Frear, 119 N.W. 894, 895 (Wis. 1909) ("Sound judicial policy precludes the court
from considering the question of the constitutionality of a legislative act unless a decision
respecting its validity is essential to the determination of some controversy calling for judicial
solution."). See generally Pedrick v. First Nat'l Bank of Ripon, 66 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis.
1954); State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor and Common Council of Watertown, 276
N.W. 311,316 (Wis. 1937); In re Heinemann's Will, 230 N.W. 698,700 (Wis. 1930).
51. See Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 230 N.W.2d 243, 248
(Wis. 1975); see also Bence v. Milwaukee, 320 N.W.2d 199,204 (Wis. 1982).
52. City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 332 N.W.2d 782, 785 (Wis. 1983); State ex rel.
First Nat'l Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 290 N.W.2d 321,
325-26 (Wis. 1980).
53. See City of Appleton v. Town of Menasha, 419 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Wis. 1988). See
also City of Madison, 332 N.W.2d at 784 ("In order to have standing to sue, a party must have
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.") (citations omitted); O'Donnell v.
Reivitz, 424 N.W.2d 733,735 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
54. Bank of Coloma, 290 N.W.2d at 325 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
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Decade noted that "[t]he federal law of standing is not binding on
Wisconsin." The Wisconsin's EnvironmentalDecade court did add that
"recent federal cases are certainly persuasive as to what the [standing]
rule should be."5'
5. Observations
The main difference between the federal standing requirements and
standing doctrine in Ohio, Missouri, and Wisconsin is the fact that
standing in federal court is required by the case and controversy
requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution.' By
contrast, Wisconsin courts have never established standing as a
jurisdictional prerequisite.- Furthermore, standing is not required by
Ohio or Missouri courts as a condition of jurisdiction.59 Clearly state
courts are not bound by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Even
federal courts concede that the federal standing requirements are not
binding on state courts.6
Under the federal standing doctrine, the parties in Sheward and
Rodriguez would never have had their day in court, because they did not

suffer an injury-in-fact.6 1 Since standing is a self-imposed jurisdictional
55. Wisconsin's EnvtL Decade,230 N.W.2d at 248.
56. Md
57. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614,617 (1973); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,101 (1968).
58. See Bank of Coloma, 290 N.W.2d at 325 n.5. Wisconsin Circuit Courts have
jurisdiction "inall matters civil and criminal." WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 8. Wisconsin Courts of
Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have "appellate jurisdiction." WIS. CONST. art.

VII, §§3,5.
59. Ohio Courts of Common Pleas have jurisdiction over all "justiciable matters." OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 4(B). Ohio Courts of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court have original
and appellate jurisdiction over various matters. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 2(B)(1)(2),
3(B)(C). Furthermore, the Ohio General Assembly has no power or authority to limit or
increase jurisdiction. See State v. Mansfield, 104 N.E. 1001, 1002 (Ohio 1913). In Missouri,
circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal. See Mo.
CONST. art. V, §14.
60. See Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 723 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 (1982) (asserting that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is not bound by the prudential limitations of jus tertii
(right of third parties) that apply to federal courts); see also Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 617 (1989).
61. Since federal standing principles are not binding on state courts, the Rodriguez and
the Sheward courts could find a way to hear the respective cases. The Rodriguez court
recognized jurisdiction because the challenge was "real and substantial" and because the case
raised constitutional questions of general interest or importance. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor
Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. 1999). The Sheward court granted original jurisdiction even
though the "relators themselves [had] no personal or private right to secure judicial review by
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restraint in state courts, however, the cases were heard. Although
recognition of jurisdiction by the Rodriguez and Sheward courts was not
per se unconstitutional, this practice of judicial activism creates a
dangerous precedent with respect to tort reform specifically, and state
jurisprudence in general.
Standing is of nation-wide concern for several reasons. First, in
relation to tort reform, a relaxed standing doctrine impairs the
legislature's ability to get laws implemented. If standing is not strictly
enforced, courts have greater ability to invalidate legislative acts. Since
tort reform is currently on the table of several state legislatures across
the country," legislatures should consider adopting the federal standing
doctrine, or overly active courts, such as the Rodriguez and the Sheward
courts, will continue to exploit a power they should not have.
Second, vague judicial interpretation of standing, especially when
state court judges are willing to overturn precedent,63 frustrates any
possibility of consistency. Hypothetically speaking, one Missouri state
court might choose to follow or adopt the federal standing doctrine,
while another Missouri state court might only require a "slight" interest
in the controversy and recognize jurisdiction. In this latter example, a
stricter interpretation of standing would persuade the court to conclude
that the case was not appropriate for judicial review.
Finally, cavalier judicial attitude toward standing by state courts
might discourage parties from litigating in federal courts and flood state
courts with frivolous and improper actions. Lax standing requirements
burden potential defendants because they encourage parties with
arguably no standing to file suit nonetheless.
C. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corporation
1. Procedural Posture of Rodriguez
Rodriguez involved a Missouri statute requiring that fifty-percent of
way of the ordinary trial and appeals process." State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1108, recons denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999) (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting).
62. See supra note 1.
63. The Rodriguez court, for example, chose not to follow the Hughlett decision, which
held that "for a party to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute he must
demonstrate that he is adversely affected by the statute in question." W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Hughlett, 729 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo. 1987). The Rodriguez court heard the case because the
challenge brought was "real and substantial" and "brought in good faith." Rodriguez, 996
S.W.2d at 52.
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all punitive damage awards be paid to the state's tort victims'
compensation fund.6' A Missouri trial court found Suzuki guilty and
awarded actual and punitive damages to the plaintiff. 5 On retrial,
Suzuki, inter alia, challenged Missouri's split recovery statute.6 The
Missouri Supreme Court recognized jurisdiction over the constitutional
issue because the corporate defendant demonstrated that it was
"adversely affected by the statute in question." 67 Oddly, the court did
not address the merits of the constitutional claim because those issues
were "not essential to the disposition of the case." 6 Suzuki used the
constitutional argument as a means
to invoke the court's jurisdiction
69
over the other issues of the case.
2. Improper Recognition of Standing
In hearing Suzuki's constitutional challenge of Missouri's split
recovery statute, the Missouri Supreme Court erroneously expanded the
doctrine of standing, squandered valuable judicial resources, and
infringed upon legislative power. The dissent argued that the defendant
lacked standing because "Suzuki would have to pay the entire punitive
damage award to the plaintiff even if the statute is declared
unconstitutional."'7' Since Suzuki was already found liable for punitive
damages,7' the recipient of the award, whether the plaintiff or the state
of Missouri, was irrelevant. Therefore, Suzuki did not have a redressible
claim because even if the court declared the statute unconstitutional
Suzuki would not have derived any benefit.
3. Improper Recognition of Jurisdiction in General
Not only did Suzuki lack standing, its allegation was not "real and
substantial. "7 The court based its jurisdictional authority on article V,
section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. That constitutional provision

64. See Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 47.
65. See id. at 50.
66. See id.
at 51; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1994).

67. Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 53; see also Hughlett, 729 S.W.2d at 206; Harrison v.
Monroe County, 716 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. 1986) (outlining standing requirements for
litigants who wish to challenge the constitutionality of a statute).

68. Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 53.
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id. at 53.
71. See id. at 50.
72. The Rodriguez court concluded, erroneously in the opinion of this author, that the
claim was real and substantial. See id. at 51.
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gives "the supreme court ...exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases
involving the validity of... a statute or provision of the constitution of
this state."'73 However, allegations concerning the constitutionality of
Missouri statutes must be real and substantial, not merely colorable.'
Missouri courts generally define colorable as "feigned, fictitious or
counterfeit."7' 5 Since the statute does not harm the defendant in
question," its allegation in Rodriguez is colorable at best.
4. Supplemental Jurisdiction
The majority in Rodriguez cited article V, section 10 of the Missouri
Constitution as a supplemental justification for their exercise of
jurisdiction.7 This provision allows the supreme court to transfer a case
sua sponte from the court of appeals before or after an opinion has been
endorsed "because of the general interest or importance of a question
involved in the case., 7
Obviously, the Rodriguez court was not
confident in its exercise of jurisdiction if it chose to cite this
supplemental justification. The citation to article V, section 10 was an
attempt by the Rodriguez court to cover its footsteps.
5. Observations
The Missouri Supreme Court abused its judicial power. Rodriguez
is, in effect, an advisory opinion because Suzuki neither had a personal
stake 9 in the outcome of the case nor was it adversely affected by the
challenged statute. The opinion will carry significant precedential
weight in Missouri state courts since it comes from the highest court in
the state." Even though the court did not actually strike down tort
reform legislation, they did hold that the constitutional claim would be
heard-despite the aforementioned arguments suggesting that the party
73. MO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
74. See AG Processing, Inc. v. S. St. Joseph Indus. Sewer Dist., 937 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996).
75. Rodriguez, 996 S.W.2d at 52.
76. The majority in Rodriguez did not demonstrate how Suzuki was "harmed by a
statute that d[id] not cause it to pay a single penny more in punitive damages that it would
without the statute." Id. at 66 (White, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 54.
78. MO. CONsT. art.V, § 10.
79. See Harrison v. Monroe County, 716 S.W.2d 263,266 (Mo. 1986).
80. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hughlett, 729 S.W.2d 203,206 (Mo. 1987).
81. Already one Missouri Court of Appeals case has followed Rodriguez. See Lopez v.
Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2295, at *4-5 (Nov. 23, 1999) ("We are
bound by [the Rodriguez] holding.").
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did not have standing.8
Standing is an important check on judicial reviewability of legislative
acts." If a court waives standing requirements to hear constitutional

challenges to statutes, the court comes close to usurping legislative
power, which leads to aggrandizement of the judicial branch.
Future courts that follow Rodriguez and hear colorable
constitutional allegations will essentially be permitted to veto any

legislation they disagree with. Moreover, courts will be able to refrain
from rigidly enforcing standing requirements because they are not
accountable to anyone. There is no way to force a state supreme court
to adopt rigid standing requirements since the United States Supreme
Court cannot hear cases relating to tort reform. If standing is not
followed by the courts, and courts cannot be forced to follow standing,
state judiciaries will essentially have the power to veto legislative action,
including any tort reform measures. The Rodriguez decision is not an
isolated incident. A few months after the Rodriguez decision came out,
the Ohio Supreme Court ignored standing requirements and heard a
challenge to similar tort reform legislation. This time, however, the
court addressed the merits of the claim-and struck down an entire tort

reform bill as unconstitutional.8
D. State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward
1. Ohio's Checks on Judicial Power

Ohio courts of law, much like other state courts across the country,
82. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47,53 (1999).
83. See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, The Seventh Anglo-American Exchange:
JudicialReview of Administrative and Regulatory Action: Reflections on Preclusionof Judicial
Review in England and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (1986); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciabilityand Separation of Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CORNELL
L. REv. 393 (1996); Sol Wachtler, JudicialLawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2000). The United States Supreme Court can only grant
certiorari to hear cases from state supreme courts when the issue pertains to the U.S.
Constitution, federal statutes, or federal treaties. See id.
85. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1072, recons.
denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999).
86. In Georgia, for example, "[l]egislative acts in violation of this constitution or the
constitution of the United States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them." GA.
CONST. art I, § 2, para. V. Other state constitutions have similar language. See, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(2) (conferring jurisdiction on the New York Court of Appeals to
review judgments declaring that a state statute violates the New York constitution); VA.
CONsT. art. VI, § 1 (granting "appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of
a law under [the Virginia] constitution"). See generally 16 AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw §
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have the power to review the constitutionality of a legislative actY. This
power of constitutional adjudication is secured exclusively in the
judiciary as a check upon the other branches of government." In turn,
Ohio law proscribes two checks to curb judiciary abuse of power. The
first one is the "policy and wisdom" check articulated in State ex rel.
Bishop v. Board of Education.'l Courts should only review questions of

Issues surrounding legislative policy are nonlegislative power.'
justiciable, no matter how foolish the policy may appear.9" A legislature
that is subordinated to the judiciary frustrates the objectives
surrounding the three branches of government. The second check, and
a major aspect of the Sheward controversy, is the policy of standing.9
2. Ohio's Trouble Spots
Ohio's standing policy is problematic for two reasons. First,
although Ohio has a common-law standing doctrine, 93 standing is one
area of civil procedure where the states are not bound by federal law.
"Unlike the federal courts, state courts are not bound by constitutional
strictures on standing... [but] state courts... are free to reject
procedural frustrations in favor of just and expeditious determination on
the ultimate merits."94 This procedural oddity encourages courts to
favor convenience over justice. Justice Resnick pointed out in her
opinion that "in state courts[,] standing is a self-imposed rule of
restraint. ' Commenting on its reasons for recognizing standing and
129 (1998); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Mandamus § 94 (1998).
87. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bowman v. Allen City Bd. of Comm'rs, 177 N.E. 271,278 (Ohio
1931); OHIO CONST. art. IV.
88. See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1079,
recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999).
89. 40 N.E.2d 913, 919 (Ohio 1992).
90. See id; Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ohio 1999); Brady v.
Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ohio 1991).
91. See Superior Dairy, Inc. v. Stark County Milk Producers' Ass'n, 100 N.E.2d 695, 700
(Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
92. For a general overview of standing in Ohio jurisprudence, see Ohio Contractors
Ass'n v. Bicking, 643 N.E.2d 1088, 1089 (Ohio 1994); State ex rel. Consumers League of Ohio
v. Ratchford, 457 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Fortner v. Thomas, 257 N.E.2d 371,
372 (Ohio 1970). For the federal guidelines on standing, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102
(1968) (holding that taxpayer has standing to sue to overturn a federal tax or spending
program). For further review of standing see supra Part II.A, II.B.
93. See supra Part II.B.2.
94. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties§ 30 (1987). In federal courts, the necessity of proving injuryin-fact remains whether the party is seeking to enforce a private or public right. See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
95. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081, recons.
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hearing the case, the Sheward court noted that a "denial of jurisdiction
would force a piecemeal determination over time of the various
provisions of the bill" and that such delay would damage the public by
"protect[ing] this legislation from any timely, meaningful and inclusive

review. "9'
The second problem in Ohio stems from the state's active judiciary."
The Ohio Supreme Court frequently recognizes standing and hears
cases with issues of great importance and interest to the public." Other
state courts similarly situated might refrain from hearing the case. A

closer look at Sheward reveals the consequences of these two problems.
3. The Sheward Facts
Sheward involved a constitutional attack on Ohio's Tort Reform Bill
House Bill 3501. brought by the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and

the Ohio AFL-CIO.°1' The parties filed a writ of mandamus and a writ
of prohibition in the Ohio Supreme Court./°2 The relators' 3 sought to
have the supreme court prohibit Ohio trial court judges from enforcing
any aspect of the tort reform bill.'" They argued that the bill "intrudes
upon judicial power by declaring itself constitutional, by reenacting
legislation struck down as unconstitutional, and by interfering with [the

Ohio Supreme Court's] power to regulate court procedure."10 5 The
Ohio Supreme Court found standing and recognized that it had original
jurisdiction."'

In a 5-4 decision, the court struck down the entire tort

reform bill as unconstitutional."
denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999).
96. Id.at 1109.
97. Id.
98. See Werber, supra note 6, at 576 ("[I]n some instances... the [supreme] court has
taken unto itself the task of speaking for the people where that role is more appropriately
assigned to the General Assembly.").
99. See id; see also State ex rel. Newell v. Brown, 122 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ohio 1954)
("Where a public right, as distinguished from a purely private right, is involved, a citizen need
not show any special interest therein, but he may maintain a proper action predicated on his
citizenship.").
100. Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 121st Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1997).
101. See Sheward,715 N.E.2d at 1062.
102. See id.
103. A relator is an "applicant for a writ." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1292 (7th Ed.
1999).
104. See generallySheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1062.
105. Id.at 1076.
106. The original jurisdiction issue will be discussed infra Part III.
107. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1072.
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The Sheward court addressed the two checks on the judiciary's abuse
of power. Although the relators' claim involved legislative policy, the
court heard the case under the public-right doctrine, despite strong
court discussion that would suggest otherwise."° For instance, the court

acknowledged that "all arguments going to the soundness of legislative
policy choices... are directed to their proper place, which is outside the
door to this courthouse."'09 Furthermore, the Trauger court wrote that

"[t]here are serious objections against allowing mere interlopers to
meddle with the affairs of the state, and it is not usually allowed unless

under circumstances when the public injury by its refusal will be
serious."" 0 The Sheward court further admitted that the claim should
not be allowed as a private action.' Nevertheless, the court enforced
the public-right doctrine because the claim was of great public
importance. 2
4. Impact of the Public-Right Doctrine
In light of the public-right doctrine, the Sheward court waived all
standing requirements." 3 The court admitted that the "[r]elators
themselves have no personal or private right to secure judicial review. '"14
Ohio frequently grants taxpaying citizens standing to bring a writ of
mandamus action to enforce a public duty, even though the citizen has
no special interest in the procurement of the right."5 Underneath the
surface, the relators do have a special interest at stake in Sheward. The
108. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1104.
109. Id. at 1072.
110. State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 64 N.E. 558, 559 (Ohio 1902).
111. See Sheward,715 N.E.2d at 1084.
112. See id. at 1104 (explaining that the court felt obliged to protect the people's interest
in keeping the judicial power of the state in whom they vested it).
113. See id. at 1084. The Sheward court noted the following:
[W]here the object of an action in mandamus... is to procure the enforcement or
protection of a public right, the relator need not show any legal interest... it being
sufficient that [the] relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such, interested in the
execution of the laws of this state.
Id.
114. Id. at 1108.
115. See Trauger, 64 N.E. at 559 (holding that private citizen may be plaintiff in a
mandamus action to enforce the performance of a public duty affecting himself as a citizen
and the citizens of the state at large); State ex rel. Newell v. Brown, 122 N.E.2d 105,107 (Ohio
1984). But see State ex reL v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644, 650 (Ohio 1883) (holding that
plaintiff seeking to enforce private rights must show some special interest in the subject
matter).
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party bringing the action in Sheward consisted mainly of trial
attorneys.'16 If punitive damage caps are declared unconstitutional,
these lawyers will benefit from increased damage awards since most
work on a contingency fee basis.' It is not a stretch of the imagination
to argue that these lawyers appear to be primarily motivated by the
potential of pecuniary gain, not by a desire to enforce a public right.
The existence of the public-right doctrine to challenge legislative
policy frustrates the principle of separation of powers. In addition, the
court's exercise of this doctrine in Sheward is clearly improper.
5. Aftermath of the Sheward Decision
Sheward should raise awareness of this tort reform war across the
country.
State courts should not be free to reject procedural
frustrations' 8 and should, at the very least, use federal court standing
policy as a guiding principle. States should not be forced into strict
compliance of federal court procedures. However, current state
standing policies," 9 particularly in Ohio and Missouri, are too moderate.
State courts are creatures of their respective state constitutions and do
not have plenary power. Exercising jurisdiction whenever a court sees
fit frustrates the judicial policy that the wisdom of a statute "is the
exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government.' ' 120 This
propensity encourages judicial activism and frustrates the legislature's
ability to formulate policy. 12 Ohio's historical inclination to apply the
public-right doctrine' " encourages more lawsuits. Courts that apply the
public-ight doctrine also run the risk of issuing advisory opinions.
In addition to the arguments in favor of eliminating the public-right
doctrine, Sheward did not involve a public interest of great

116. See Shewari, 715 N.E.2d at 1068 n.1.
117. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 526 (1986).
118. See supraPart II.D.2.
119. See supra Part II.B.2-4; see, e.g., Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo.
1977); In re Estate of Wellman, 673 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Ill. 1996); State v. Baltimore, 495
N.W.2d 921, 925 (Neb. 1993); Morse Bros. Prestress, Inc. v. City of Lake Oswego, 640 P.2d
650,651 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
120. State ex rel Bishop v. Bd. of Educ., 40 N.E.2d 913,919 (Ohio 1992).
121. Alexander M. Bickel asserts that "when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act.., it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people... and... exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (2d ed. 1986).
122- See, e.g., State ex rel. Carter v. N. Olmsted, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1054 (Ohio 1994)
(holding that taxpayer has standing to enforce the public's right to proper execution of city
charter removal provisions, regardless of any private or personal benefit).
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importance.'23 Attacking the constitutionality of the bill is not a public
duty. Furthermore, refusal of jurisdiction will not cause public injury.
Since the impact of the tort reform bill is unknown, concluding that it is
an issue of great public importance is erroneous. Since the bill is still in
infancy, there is insufficient evidence to prove that a refusal of standing
will result in a serious public injury. The court should not grant
jurisdiction based on an anticipated injury to the public. Otherwise,
causes of action would seemingly never end.
Second, there was no public duty to be enforced because the impact
of House Bill 350 could not have been predicted until there was more
evidence of the impact of the statute. Sheward prematurely expressed a
desire to "protect the people's interest in keeping the judicial power of
the state in whom they vested it. "'2 Prohibiting a legislative act, which is
the relief sought in Sheward, is not a public duty, and the court's waiver
of the injury-in-fact requirement was inappropriate.
Although the public-right doctrine is rooted in Ohio jurisprudence,
extending the doctrine "so as to equate public duty with enforcement of
the doctrine of separation of powers, or with preservation of judicial
power within the judiciary ,126 is a revolutionary act. Moreover, the
supreme court struck down the entire statute, which encompassed over
246 pages, instead of nullifying certain provisions. ' 27
It is the
constitutional duty of the Ohio Supreme Court to use all legal means to
preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary-but not to
abuse it."
III. SHEWARD: IMPROPER GRANT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

A. Introduction
Not only were the relators in Sheward the wrong parties, "they
sought the wrong relief in the wrong court." 29 Their petitions for writs
of mandamus and prohibition were clearly masked requests for an
123. The Sheward court enforced the public-right doctrine because it argued the issue
was of great public importance. See 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1104, recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170
(Ohio 1999).
124. See supra Part II.D.2.
125. 715 N.E.2d at 1104.
126. Id. at 1116 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
127. See Peck, supra note 14.
128. See, e.g., Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ohio 1997) ("Interpretation of the
state and federal Constitutions is a role exclusive to the judicial branch.").
129. Sheward, 715 N.E. 2d at 1079.
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injunction, which cannot be heard by the Ohio Supreme Court. 3° The
Ohio Supreme Court's willingness to grant original jurisdiction in
Sheward is a grave danger to the separation of powers and, furthermore,
it compromises the integrity of the Ohio legal system.
The Ohio Supreme Court has original jurisdiction for any writ of
mandamus or writ of prohibition action.' In Sheward, the relators
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court judges from
implementing the provisions of Ohio's Tort Reform Bill.3 2
Additionally, they sought a writ of mandamus ordering respondents (the
judges) to follow "'the rules of civil procedure, the rules of evidence, the
relevant constitutional decisions and common law notwithstanding
contrary provisions in [House Bill 350]."' 3

The court granted the

writs. 1m The facts in Sheward, however, do not satisfy the common law
requirements for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition.1 5 The
relators disguised their request for declaratory relief as a writ of
mandamus, and since the Ohio Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
grant an injunction, '3 the grant of the writ of mandamus was erroneous.
In State ex rel. Governor v. Taft, the court held that a mandamus action,
challenging the constitutionality of a bill, cannot be maintained in the
Supreme Court of Ohio where the actual relief sought is in the nature of
a declaratory judgment or injunction.37 Finally, the relators lacked
standing to bring the prohibition and mandamus actions.
B. The Writ of Prohibition
1. Requirements
Ohio case law establishes a specific test for a writ of prohibition.
The requirements are as follows:
(1) the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about
to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power;
(2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law; and
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2.
See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(1)(b)(d).
715 N.E.2d at 1062.

Id.
See id. at 1111.
See infra Part III.A, III.B.
See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2.
640 N.E.2d 1136,1138 (Ohio 1994).
For a discussion of standing in the Sheward case, see supraPart II.D.
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(3) that refusal of the writ will result in injury for which there is
no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.'39
Clearly "[p]rohibition is not available to determine the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, where the relator has... an
adequate remedy at law by way of appeal.'40 Prohibition is an
extraordinary remedy reserved for exceptional circumstances and "will
not lie to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment."'4 1 In other
words, a writ of prohibition should only be granted as a last legal resort.
2. Applying the test to Sheward
Sheward did not involve any potential exercise of unauthorized
judicial power by the respondents. 42 As trial court judges, respondents
are authorized to decide cases filed in their courts.14 The trial courts can

hear cases involving allegations that statutes are unconstitutional;'" they
have not yet been presented with an opportunity to decide the
constitutionality of the tort reform bill. 45 Even if the trial courts had
ruled on, 14House Bill 350, "a writ of prohibition is not a substitute for
appeal. " 6

Furthermore, the relators clearly had alternative adequate remedies
available at the trial court level, although the trial courts have no
139. State ex rel. Susi v. Flowers, 330 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ohio 1975); State ex rel. McKee v.
Cooper, 320 N.E.2d 286,288 (Ohio 1974).
140. State ex reL Crebs v. Court of Common Pleas, 309 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Ohio 1974).
But see Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 505 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ohio 1987) (holding
that a court may hear the appeal where there remains a debatable constitutional question to
resolve, or "where the matter appealed is one of great public or general interest").
141. State ex reL. Mansfield Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 215 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ohio 1966); State ex
reL Bier v. Court of Common Pleas, 194 N.E.2d 849, 850 (Ohio 1963); see also State ex reL
Zakany v. Avellone, 387 N.E.2d 1373, 1374 (Ohio 1979) (arguing that prohibition, an extraordinary remedy entertained with caution, "will not lie to prevent an anticipated erroneous
judgment").
142. Parts one and two of the three-part test for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
require that a court or official against whom the writ is sought must be about to exercise
judicial power that is unauthorized by law. See Flowers, 330 N.E.2d at 662; Cooper, 320
N.E.2d at 286.
143. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4.
144. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.02 (Anderson 2000); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1116, recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio
1999) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
145. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1116 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) ("Relators are, in effect,
improperly pursuing interlocutory appeals of rulings that the trial courts have not yet made,
but that the relators suspect they may make.").
146. State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe, 35 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Ohio 1941).

2000]

ABUSE OFPOWER

jurisdiction to grant extraordinary writs.147 Trial courts have general4

jurisdiction and the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional.' 1
For example, a "declaratory judgment action offers an adequate remedy
to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, initially in the trial courts,
followed by appellate review. 149 Thus, the proper route would be to file
a declaratory judgment suit in an Ohio trial court.
C. The Writ of Mandamus
1. Requirements
Mandamus, like prohibition, is not a substitute for appeal."' The
unenvious prospect of maintaining an action through a lengthy appeal
process "does not entitle the relator to such an extraordinary writ."",
Requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are similar to
those needed for a writ of prohibition. The court must find "that the
relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent
is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested
act, and that relator
52
has no plain and adequate remedy at law."1
2. Applying the test to Sheward
The relators had no legal right to have the judges "follow 'the rules
of civil procedure, the rules of evidence, the relevant constitutional
decisions and common-law... notwithstanding contrary provisions in
[House Bill 350]"'" because they lacked standing, although the Sheward
court did grant standing." Moreover, the relators had the right to file
suit at the trial court level, which would have ensured that their claims

147. See State ex rel Bernges v. Common Pleas Court, 260 N.E.2d 839, 840-41 (Ohio
1970) (holding that the court of common pleas does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of

prohibition).
148. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4.
149. Sheward,715 N.E.2d at 1116 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
150. See State ex rel Keenan v. Calabrese, 631 N.E.2d 119,121 (Ohio 1994).
151. State ex rel Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 n.2. (Ohio 1991)
(emphasis added); see also State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy, 451 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ohio 1983)
("[W]here a constitutional process of appeal has been legislatively provided, the sole fact that
pursuing such process would encompass more delay and inconvenience than seeking a writ of
mandamus is insufficient to prevent the process from constituting a plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.") (citations omitted).
152. State ex rel.Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon, 399 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Ohio 1980).
153. Sheward,715 N.E.2d at 1069 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 1084-85.
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potentially could be heard at all three levels of the Ohio court system.'55
Mandamus is an improper cause of action to challenge the
constitutionality of House Bill 350.
Even if a mandamus action could be maintained, the relators'
request in Sheward is for injunctive relief. A writ of mandamus remedy
is problematic because it bears a striking resemblance to injunctive
relief.'56 Thus, citizens might disguise an injunction as a writ of
mandamus in order to get their claim heard quickly by the Ohio
Supreme Court.157 The Zupancic court noted that "[it] will scrutinize
pleadings in order to assure that actions filed by parties requesting
mandamus relief are consistent with... prior decisions as to the form
and substance of the relief sought.', 5 8 The Pressley court, meanwhile,
set out to determine the type of relief the plaintiff actually desired. That
court wrote the following:
Where a petition filed in the supreme court or in the court of
appeals is in the form of a proceeding in mandamus but the
substance of the allegations makes it manifest that the real object
of the relator is for an injunction, such a petition does not state a
cause of action in mandamus and since neither the supreme court
nor the court of appeals has original jurisdiction in injunction the
action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 59
Yet, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition in Sheward,
even though the relators in reality sought an injunction barring the
Common Pleas court judges from enforcing the provisions of House Bill
350. In summary, the grant of original jurisdiction was an abuse of
power by the Ohio Supreme Court, ' 60 which compromised the principle
155. See id. at 1114 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
156. Chief Justice Moyer elaborates on this controversy in his dissent. Moyer states that
"an order prohibiting an official from carrying out a duty imposed by a current statute,
because it is unconstitutional, is of no substantive difference from an order mandating that
the official carry out duties established by preexisting law, because the current statute is
unconstitutional." Id. at 1116 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
157. Injunctions and declaratory judgments disguised as a writ of mandamus cannot be
heard by the Ohio Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Governor v. Taft, 640 N.E.2d 1136, 1138
(Ohio 1994).
158. State ex reL Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1208 (Ohio 1991).
159. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm'n, 228 N.E.2d 631,631 (Ohio 1967) (syllabus).
160. The grant of original jurisdiction violates the separation of powers because the
court is exercising jurisdiction when it has no statutory authority to do so. Since I discussed
the effects of this violation in Part I, I will focus on the impact of the violation of the tri-level
judiciary in this section.

2000]

ABUSE OFPOWER

of a tri-level judiciary because it is an improper waiver of standard civil
procedures.
3. The Proper Avenue
The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers should have brought the action
in trial court, so the suit could be subject to the appeal process. Parties
are legally required to follow the ordinary course of judicial review
absent certain circumstances. In addition, with more judges hearing the
case and greater time and scope of fact finding, the Ohio courts as a
whole would be better situated to reach a prudent legal conclusion.
Most importantly, given the scope of House Bill 350, granting original
jurisdiction will place future tort reform under immense scrutiny. The
relators in effect bypassed standard jurisdictional channels to challenge
the entire tort reform enactments.'61 Future bills will be susceptible to
attack through the granting of extraordinary writs, despite ready access
to "'standard trial and appellate avenues.' it162
IV. CONCLUSION

A. Options
State governments have several options to alleviate controversy
surrounding this tort reform war. Wisconsin, or any other state for that
matter, should take the initiative in hope of creating a "domino effect"
in which all states would clarify the judiciary-legislature relationship.
First, state representatives could establish a Uniform Tort Law. A
major problem right now is that state legislatures are trying to outdo
their peers. Why did Ohio feel it was necessary to pass a bill five times
longer than the recent Illinois tort bill?' 3 Recent tort reform bills
cannot help but create controversy. Although torts are common law
causes of action, states have passed other uniform acts, such as the
Uniform Commercial Code, which deals in areas traditionally governed
by common law.'6' Even at a rudimentary level, uniformity might
facilitate more reasonable tort reform statutes that might not be
161. See Recent Cases, State Tort Reform-Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down State
GeneralAssembly's Tort Reform Initiative,113 HARV. L. REV. 804,806 (2000).
162. Id. at 806 (quoting State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d
1062,1114, recons. denied, 716 N.E.2d 1170 (Ohio 1999)).
163. See Peck, supra note 14, at 66.
164. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1
(5th ed. 2000).
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challenged as readily as they were in Ohio.
Second, legislatures can codify standing requirements, much like
they have for personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Courts receive
their power from state constitutions; legislatures can propose
constitutional amendments.'6' Similarly, the legislature can also limit the
availability of original jurisdiction.
Third, both the courts and the legislature could tone down their
respective aggressiveness. A main theme of this Comment is the "war"
over tort reform and judicial power. This does not have to be the case.
Unfortunately, "both sides in the tort law debate may be guilty of
exaggerating the promises and perils of reform measures."'66 If both
sides soften their stance, the retaliatory element in the struggle might
subside.
B. Aftermath of Rodriguez and Sheward

Ohio and Missouri's lax standing requirements and Ohio's
controversial recognition of original jurisdiction in Sheward 67 present
daunting obstacles to the preservation of the separation of powers.
Courts should eliminate the dangerous practice of allowing citizens to
intrude into affairs traditionally reserved for the legislature. Citizens
who have not suffered an injury-in-fact should follow the proper route if
they are upset with new legislation, by petitioning the legislature to
voice their concerns, not burden the courts with their grievances.
Furthermore, Rodriguez and Sheward did not express confidence in
their opinions. Rodriguez offered a supplemental justification for its
exercise of jurisdiction.' 6' The Sheward court included the "anatomy" of

the dissents1 69 in its opinion.
Additionally, both cases establish new standing doctrines and are
examples of abusive judicial power. Rodriguez ignores the standing
requirement. Sheward overrules Ohio case law and permits a party to
obtain a writ of mandamus to enforce a public right without the relator
proving a special interest in the subject matter.7 The judiciary cannot
act with such indiscretion.
165. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1; MO. CONST. art. 12, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. XII,

§ 1.
166. Thompson, supra note 9, at 69.
167. 715 N.E.2d at 1084-85.
168. 996 S.W.2d 47, 54 (Mo. 1999).
169. At the end of its opinion, the majority addressed several of the dissenters'
arguments. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1103-11.
170. 715 N.E.2d at 1116 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
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Other states, including Wisconsin, that will undoubtedly face a tort
reform controversy in the future, must not make the same mistakes.
The three-branch system of government is not perfect. On many issues
one of the branches must have the final word. The judiciary, under our
current legal system, has the power to find loopholes in the system and
exercise its discretion. The legislative and executive branches must limit
this discretionary power. Otherwise, the future of the separation of
powers and any possibility of tort reform are at stake. If other state
courts choose to follow the reasoning of the Ohio and the Missouri
supreme courts, they will trigger similar legislative-judicial tension and
place an eternal obstacle in the path of tort reform.
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